Abstract-We present a simplified proof of Japaridze's arithmetical completeness theorem for the well-known polymodal provability logic GLP. The simplification is achieved by employing a fragment J of GLP that enjoys a more convenient Kripke-style semantics than the logic considered in the papers by Ignatiev and Boolos. In particular, this allows us to simplify the arithmetical fixed point construction and to bring it closer to the standard construction due to Solovay. The logic GLP is given by the following axiom schemata and inference rules.
A valuation v on a frame W maps every propositional variable p to a subset v(p) ⊆ W called the truth set of p. A Kripke model is a Kripke frame together with a valuation on it.
Let W = (W, v) be a Kripke model. By induction on the build-up of ϕ we define a relation "ϕ is valid in a world x of W " (denoted W, x ϕ). 
W, x p ⇐⇒ x ∈ v(p)
,
W, x [n]ϕ ⇐⇒ ∀y ∈ W (xR n y ⇒ W, y ϕ).
We write W ϕ if ∀x ∈ W W, x ϕ. For the axioms of J to be valid in a given Kripke frame for any valuation of variables, we impose some restrictions on the relations R k . A transitive binary relation R on a set W is called Noetherian if there is no infinite chain of elements of W of the form a 0 Ra 1 Ra 2 . . . . Note that if W is finite, the condition that R is Noetherian on W is equivalent to its irreflexivity.
A frame (W ; The converse statement, that is, the completeness theorem for J with respect to the class of all (finite) J-models, is proved in [2] . By a root of a J-frame (W ; R 0 , R 1 , . . .) we mean an element r ∈ W for which ∀x ∈ W ∃k ≥ 0 rR k x or r = x. Proposition 1. For any formula ϕ, if J ϕ, then there is a finite J-model W with a root r such that W, r ϕ.
Formal arithmetic and provability predicates. First-order theories formulated in the language (0, , +, · , =) and containing the axioms of the Peano arithmetic PA will be called arithmetical. It is known that one can introduce terms for all primitive recursive functions into the language of PA. By Δ 0 denote the class of arithmetical formulas having only bounded occurrences of quantifiers, that is, those of the form ∀x (x ≤ t → ϕ) or ∃x (x ≤ t ∧ ϕ), where the term t does not contain the variable x.
The classes of Σ n -and Π n -formulas are defined by induction: Δ 0 -formulas are considered as both Σ 0 -and Π 0 -formulas; Σ n+1 -formulas are those of the form ∃ x ϕ( x, y), where ϕ is a Π n -formula; Π n+1 -formulas are those of the form ∀ x ϕ( x, y), where ϕ is a Σ n -formula.
We assume some fixed standard primitive recursive Gödel numbering of the language of arithmetic. The Gödel number of an object τ (term, formula, etc.) is denoted by τ . We will also deal with Gödel numbers of terms and formulas in the formal context of PA. We will use the following abbreviations.
A natural number n will be denoted by the numeral n = 0 ... (n primes) in the language of PA; for a given formula ϕ, the expression ϕ will be understood as the corresponding numeral ϕ .
We will also consider, within PA, primitive recursive families of formulas ϕ n depending on a parameter n ∈ N. In this case, the expression ϕ x will be understood as a primitive recursive definable term (with a free variable x) whose value for a given n is the Gödel number of ϕ n . In particular, ϕ(x) is a term for the function that, given n, computes the Gödel number of the result of substituting n into ϕ. Following Boolos [3] , we will use ϕ[ψ] as an abbreviation for ϕ( ψ ) and ϕ[ψ x ] as that for ϕ( ψ x ). The intuitive meaning of these expressions is that the formula ψ (respectively, ψ x ) satisfies the property expressed by ϕ.
It will also be convenient for us to assume that a new sort of variables α, β, . . . ranging over the set of Gödel numbers of arithmetical formulas is introduced into the language of arithmetic. Formulas containing variables α, β, . . . are treated as abbreviations for their natural translations into the standard language of PA. We will use the abbreviations ϕ α and ϕ[ψ α ] for families of formulas parametrized by the new sort of variables in the same sense as for the numerical parameters.
Let T be an arithmetical theory, and let Pr(α) be an arithmetical formula with a single free variable α. Following [4] , we call Pr a provability predicate of level n over T if, for any arithmetical sentences ϕ and ψ,
Notice that conditions (1) and (4) imply the so-called third condition of Löb:
Recall that an arithmetical theory T is called sound if T ϕ implies N ϕ for each arithmetical sentence ϕ. Similarly, a provability predicate Pr is called
A sequence π of formulas Pr 0 , Pr 1 , . . . is called a strong sequence of provability predicates over T if there is a sequence of natural numbers r 0 < r 1 < r 2 < . . . such that, for any n ≥ 0,
(1) Pr n is a provability predicate of level r n over T ;
We recall two standard examples of strong sequences of provability predicates over PA. It is known that, for each n ≥ 1, there is a Π n -truth definition for the class of Π n -formulas in PA, that is, an arithmetical Π n -formula Tr Πn (α) expressing in a natural way the predicate "α is the Gödel number of a true arithmetical Π n -sentence."
Let Pr PA denote the usual Gödelian provability predicate for PA (of level 0).
Notice that Pr n (α) expresses the fact that α is provable in the theory axiomatized over PA by the set of all true Π n -sentences; this predicate has level n.
Another strong sequence of provability predicates is defined by the closure of PA under the n-fold application of the ω-rule. Define Pr 0 = Pr PA and
Notice that Pr n has level 2n.
With each provability predicate of level n, one can associate an analog of the predicate "y is a proof of α," that is, a Π n -formula Prf(α, y) such that
Without loss of generality we can assume that Prf is chosen in such a way that each number y is a proof of at most one formula α, and that any provable formula has arbitrarily long proofs. These properties are assumed to be verifiable in PA.
Arithmetical interpretation of GLP. Fix a strong sequence of provability predicates π over a theory T . An arithmetical realization is any function f mapping each propositional variable p of the language of GLP to some arithmetical sentence f (p). For a given π, any arithmetical realization is uniquely extended to a map f π defined on the set of all modal formulas as follows:
, and similarly for the other Boolean connectives;
The arithmetical formula f π (ϕ) is called a translation of the modal formula ϕ under the realization f . By induction on the length of proof of a formula ϕ it is easy to establish the soundness of GLP under the arithmetical interpretation with respect to any strong sequence of provability predicates over T .
Proof. The only nontrivial element in the proof of this lemma is to show that the translation of Löb's axiom is provable under every arithmetical realization. Such a proof is obtained with the aid of the fixed point lemma similarly to the proof of Löb's theorem for the standard provability predicate in PA.
The converse statement is valid under a sufficiently broad assumption of the soundness of the considered provability predicates and constitutes the essence of Japaridze's arithmetical completeness theorem for GLP [5, 4] . Thus, GLP is the provability logic for any strong sequence of sound provability predicates. The remaining part of the paper is devoted to a proof of this theorem. Our proof of Theorem 1 follows a general approach suggested in the fundamental paper of Solovay [7] and uses some additional ideas contained in [5, 4] .
Given a modal formula ϕ, let M (ϕ) denote
where [m i ]ϕ i for i < s ranges over all subformulas of ϕ of the form [k]ψ and n = max i<s m i . Further, let
Obviously, GLP M + (ϕ). Theorem 1 is a consequence of the following theorem, which also characterizes GLP in terms of Kripke models.
Theorem 2. For any modal formula ϕ, the following statements are equivalent:
Note that the implication (iii) ⇒ (ii) follows from Proposition 1, the implication (i) ⇒ (iv) follows from Lemma 2, and (ii) ⇒ (i) is obvious. Thus, to prove Theorem 2, it suffices to establish the implication (iv) ⇒ (iii).
We argue by contradiction and fix a formula ϕ and a finite J-model W 0 with a root r such that 
We are going to specify an arithmetical realization f by assigning to each x ∈ W an arithmetical sentence S x and by letting
We impose the following requirements on the sentences S x :
(S1) T x∈W S x , and T ¬(S x ∧ S y ) for all x = y;
Suppose that requirements (S1)-(S3) are met and a realization f is defined by ( * ).
Lemma 3. For each subformula θ of the formula ϕ and each
Proof. We jointly prove (a) and (b) by induction on the build-up of the formula θ. If θ is a variable or has the form θ 1 ∧ θ 2 or ¬θ 1 , the statements follow from the definition of f together with (S1).
Then there is a y ∈ W 0 such that xR k y and W, y ψ. By the induction hypothesis T S y → ¬f π (ψ). It follows that T f π (ψ) → ¬S y and
To prove (a), assume W,
; then for some z we have x ∈ R * k+1 (z) ∪ {z} and w ∈ R * k (z). Obviously, ∀y ∈ R k (x) W, y ψ, and since
Since ∀w ∈ R k (x) W, w ψ, by the induction hypothesis we obtain T S w → f π (ψ) for all w ∈ R k (x), and therefore T w∈ R k (x) S w → f π (ψ). Using the derivability conditions, we find that
As a corollary of this lemma we obtain
, and hence T ¬S 0 by (S2). Since T is sound, we have N S 0 , which contradicts (S4). Thus, our assumption T f π (ϕ) is wrong; that is, Lemma 3 implies Theorem 2.
To complete the proof of Theorem 2, it remains to construct arithmetical sentences S x satisfying (S1)-(S4). A number m is called the rank of a model W if R m = ∅ and R k = ∅ for all k > m. For each k ≤ m, we are going to construct arithmetical functions h k : N → W with the aid of the arithmetical fixed point theorem. Informally speaking, the function h 0 is the "usual" Solovay function for the frame (W, R 0 ) and the provability predicate Pr 0 , whereas the functions h k+1 are its analogues for the frames (W, R k+1 ) and the predicates Pr k+1 linked by the condition that the initial value h k+1 (0) is set to the limit value of the function h k , for all k < m.
More formally, let k denote the limit of the function h k . A sentence S x is defined as a formalization of the statement m = x, that is,
where H m (n, x) is a formula expressing h m (n) = x. We notice that S x is a primitive recursive function of x and H m .
We would like to construct functions h k (provably in T ) satisfying the following conditions for all k ≤ m:
Here Prf k denotes the proof predicate associated with the predicate Pr k . A direct formalization of conditions (1) and (2) yields a sequence of arithmetical formulas A k for k ≤ m that define a system of m + 1 equations in the unknown formulas H 0 , . . . , H m :
Notice that k is formally expressible via H k , and thus via A k ( H m , k−1 , n, x). Hence, we can successively substitute each equation in system (3), starting from the first, into the next one, thereby eliminating all the definitions of k . Eventually, we obtain one equation defining H m as a fixed point amenable to an application of the standard fixed point lemma:
With H m constructed, the converse substitutions yield all the other formulas H k , k < m, satisfying (3) .
Notice that A k belongs to the class Δ 0 (Σ r k ), since Prf k ∈ Π r k . Unwinding the definitions of k−1 shows that each formula H k belongs to the class Σ r k +1 (modulo the equivalence in PA). We also immediately obtain the following lemma.
The following lemma completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 5. Conditions (S1)-(S4) hold for the constructed sentences {S
Proof. Condition (S1) follows from Lemma 4(iii). (S2) is obtained by formalizing the following argument in T . Suppose S x ; then either k = x or x ∈ R * k+1 ( k ). Notice that in both cases
For any A ⊆ W let m ∈ A denote the sentence y∈A S y . To prove (S3), we have to show, for each x = 0, that
We formalize in T the following argument.
Assume S x , where x = 0, and let
and, since this property is definable by a Δ 0 -formula,
On the other hand, since k = z, we have ∃n h k (n) = z. The latter statement is definable by an arithmetical Σ r k +1 -formula; hence
It follows that
In particular, for u = z we obtain
, and using (4) we obtain Pr k [ m ∈ R k (x)], as required.
(S4) By induction on k we show that N k = 0 for all k ≤ m. If k = z = 0 holds in the standard model of arithmetic, then Pr k [¬S z ], since by the induction hypothesis (for k > 0) there holds h k (0) = k−1 = 0. Since Pr k is sound, it follows that k = z. Thus, k = 0.
SOME GENERALIZATIONS
The requirement that T , together with all the provability predicates π, be sound is natural but stronger than necessary for the validity of the arithmetical completeness theorem for GLP.
A sequence π of provability predicates is called strongly consistent over T if the theory T + {Con n : n < ω} is consistent, where Con n denotes ¬Pr n [⊥] . Obviously, every sequence of sound provability predicates over T is strongly consistent. The converse is, in general, not true. Indeed, if Pr n is the provability predicate for the theory axiomatized over T by the set of all true Π n -sentences (as above), then Con n is equivalent to the so-called uniform Σ n -reflection principle over T . Thus, T + {Con n : n < ω} is equivalent to the extension of T by the full uniform reflection schema, that is, to T +RFN(T ) (see [6, 1] ). It is easy to give examples of unsound theories T for which, nevertheless, the theory T + RFN(T ) is consistent. 
